The present paper treats the issue of economic foundations, on which political power rests, and the specific problem of public debt in the developed countries. Starting from the general question: "Why do rich governments borrow so much?" the paper develops a model of political power based on the possession of capital, and on the transformation of public possession into private property rights. Empirical investigation follows, in a sample of 21 countries, demonstrating that there is an objectively existing transfer of capital from public borrowing to private property rights; that transfer is connected mostly to the property of non--productive assets, and goes beyond the easily inferable relation to net exports. That the transfer from public borrowing to private property rights is strongly correlated with the relative dispersion or concentration of power in the political system. We are witnessing a progressive withdrawal of public finance and public borrowing as a means of transferring capital, with a simultaneously growing idiosyncrasy (cross--sectinal variance) of fiscality.
Introduction
Politicians use to do things that economists qualify as stupid. That is a plain social fact.
Saying that a given public policy, regarding economic matters, is "politically driven" is almost an insult. Yet, treating the political side of public governance as simply "irrational" is irrational in itself. Politics are a set of patterns of behaviour, and said patterns have emerged on the grounds of some social changes. From the economic point of view, fiscal policy is maybe the most controversial field of public governance.
According to the "Fiscal Monitor", issued by the International Monetary Fund in October 2013, reducing public indebtedness is one of the major challenges that the global economy is currently facing. Restrictive fiscal policies that lead to that purpose are socially painful, sometimes pro--cyclical, and politically risky (if not suicidal). Most of the current research focuses on the short--term, cyclical outcomes of fiscal restrictions. Yet, another issue is even more important: how durable and sustainable are the fiscal outcomes of these policies? If we succeed in reducing public indebtedness by five per cent of GDP today, what is the likelihood of that being a durable gain? Will the public sector stay mean and lean for decades or will it behave according to a post--diet--yoyo pattern?
The theory of economics, at least the contemporary one, seems to be dominated by the confrontation of two standpoints. On the one hand, there is the economic mainstream with the assumption that public debt is a burden to the economy. (e.g. Meade 1958 1 ;
Modigliani 1961 2 ; Diamond 1965 3 ). On the other hand, some vota separata to that mainstream opinion has been expressed, for example, by the early post--keynesians: Abba Lerner (Lerner 1943 4 ) and Alvin H.Hansen (Hansen 1945 5 ). Later developments, based on the so--called "Ricardian equivalence", and brought forth mostly by Robert Barro (Sraffa 1951 6 ; Barro 1974 Barro 7 , 1979 Barro 8 , 1986 Barro 9 , 1987 10 , 1989a 11 , 1989b 12 ), with to prove that the accumulation of public debt is closely matched, and functionally linked to the accumulation of private property rights in the wealthiest layers of society (Mankiw 2000 22 ).
The main line of confrontation in the economic doctrine, as for public debt, is whether it is a burden for the economy or not. At best, with the Robert Barro's view, we can assume that debt is economically neutral. Keeping all that in mind, let's have a look at some stylized facts about public debt. At the end of 2011, only fourteen countries, among the 188 reported, did not have any gross public debt, i.e. their public sectors did not have any financial liabilities (IMF 2012 23 ). The total value of the global, gross public debt at the end of 2011 was of 55 trillions of USD, which corresponded to some 79% of the global GDP. Six countries owed over 80% of that total, namely: Japan, United States, Germany, Italy, France, and United Kingdom. The richest borrow the most, so to say. The One of the goals of the present paper is to develop a synthesis of the purely economic approach to public debt with the political one. The chief thought of that path is taken from Max Weber (1947 24 ; 1978 25 ), namely that a full explanation of social phenomena requires not only to draw a normative model of rational behaviour recommended in the given case, but also to explain the motives that push social actors to depart from that model. The theory of politics is traditionally attached to two concepts, both taken from the Weber--Parsons tradition, namely: action and system (besides the already cited works of Max Weber, the following seems relevant: Parsons, Shills 1951 26 ; Parsons 21 Wolff, E. N., 1998, Recent Trends in the Size Distribution of Household Wealth, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1998, no. 12(3), pp. 131-150 22 Mankiw , N. G., 2000, The Savers-Spenders Theory of Fiscal Policy, American Economic Review, no. 90 (2) , pp. 120-125. 23 World Economic Outlook April 2013, the database, available at www.imf.org 24 Weber Max, 1947 , The Theory of Social And Economic Organisation, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York, Oxford University Press 25 Weber, M.,1978, Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology, University of California Press. 26 Parsons, T., Shills, E.A., 1951 [ed] , Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Harvard University Pressm 1951 1937--1949 27 ). Action is marked by purpose (or motive, according to the strict Max Weber's terms). Actions form a system, when we can observe a phenomenon of advanced self--explanation in a set of actions; any action can be explained by its relation to other actions of the set, and there is a clear frontier, beyond which we do not need to go for explanation (although, of course, we could). Nicklas Luhmann used the term of "operational closure" to describe that capacity of a system to be self--explanatory (Luhmann 1992 28 ). Hence, in order to explain the accumulation of huge public debt in otherwise rich and stable democracies, we are about to define a self -explanatory set of actions that can form an operationally closed system. Action and purpose make strategies. This brings us back to the theory of games and allows the bridging from political sciences to economics. We can assume that there is such an operationally closed system of political strategies, in the sense of Nicklas Luhman's systems theory, which allows the accumulation of public debt as a rational means to accumulate political power. That assumption is confronted with a substantial body of research in political sciences, which proves quite convincingly that some characteristics of the political system are crucial for the accumulation of public debt. The trait that seems particularly important is the relative dispersion of political power, for example among various veto players. The greater that relative dispersion of political powers within the national, political system, the greater the propensity of the government to accumulate public debt We face a paradox at the junction of economics and politics. Having accumulated more public debt than predecessors did is a typical ground for criticism in politics. It can even become a pretty reliable way to lose political power in the next elections. Why, then, have the politicians in charge, in the richest countries of the globe, been doing something so suicidal? One possible answer is: to promote social outcomes, that taxes didn't suffice to finance. This is the "distress" logic of public borrowing: governments 27 borrow because they have to, in order to achieve wealth for their citizens. It is not quite clear why any substitution of private capital to the public one couldn't do the job, but let's assume that this is a possible explanation. The second possible answer is: governments borrow because they can, and the richer the whole society is, the more they can borrow, and they use this opportunity.
At this point it is worth to notice that the great majority of economic literature devoted to the topic of public debt tacitly assumes that in the action of public borrowing, the government is the active part, whilst the capital markets are rather passively reacting.
After all, sovereign debt is a low risk asset… Conversely to that commonly assumed attribution of roles, the present paper returns to the old thesis of Adam Smith, that public debt emerges and accumulates because of the development of capital markets.
Adam Smith stated that public borrowing emerged when the private sector had accumulated a surplus of capital, temporarily not used in financing business strictly spoken. The owners of that surplus looked for employing those assets in a profitable way, which, in turn, created favourable conditions for governments (monarchs in Adam Smith's times) to become more and more prodigal, and to borrow more and more from private creditors.
In other words, in the Smithsonian approach we think in terms of a balance sheet and assume that borrowing is always the broke cousin of lending. Does it matter at all? Let's illustrate the problem with the example of consumer loans. If monetary statistics show that households have been increasingly borrowing, the most immediate explanation of any economist is that it is because banks are lending more, thus the supply of money is greater. Further, in that path, we could conclude that maybe the interest rates should go up. No serious economist would assume that the dominant cause of the growing borrowing from the part of households is their deteriorating material status. No serious economist would assume that households borrow more because they are in such a financial distress. They borrow more because banks lend them more -that's the canonical (and rational) approach. Yet, in the case of public debt, for some reason, reason does not work any more. When governments borrow more, we tend to assume that they do so because they have their back against the wall. There is not really a crowd of economists claiming that governments borrow more because creditors lend them more, and that the capital market is the spiritus movens of public borrowing.
There is a deeper logic behind that Smithsonian thesis that public borrowing is mostly driven by the supply of capital from the private sector. Instead of seeing public debt outstanding as the cumulative outcome of more or less random flows of borrowing, we see it as a balance sheet. Public debt has to have a mirroring set of assets financed with that debt. What are these assets? In other words, what durable, capital goods are created on the grounds of public borrowing? Are they property rights? Are they public goods?
All those theoretical questions have practical implications. From the practical point of view, the distinction is between fiscal policies that effectively work and those that do not. If we assume that the accumulation of public debt is the outcome of financial distress of governments in carrying out their public mission, the logical way of slowing down their run toward the fiscal cliff is to cut on the public mission, in other words to drive the whole society into the conservative paradise. Yet, the obvious drawback of such policies is that politically they are seldom enforceable, unless the government wants to have a popular upheaval to handle (e.g. the case of Greece or Spain). Besides, social cuts usually bring about the loss of jobs, which deteriorates the tax base, and further contributes to worsen the fiscal balance.
If, conversely, we assume that public borrowing is mostly driven by the capital market, i.e. by a pressure to transfer capital from one place in that market to another place, with the help of specific, low--risk contracts connected to public borrowing, the recipe changes. Find a substitute way of transferring capital with minimum risk, or increase the risk connected to public borrowing, and public borrowing might become useless, or at least much less attractive. The present paper goes definitely in this direction. It takes anew the old Smithsonian hypothesis of public debt being pushed by the capital markets. To that, the author adds a development on the previously cited research of Franco Modigliani. Modigliani very convincingly showed that there is a clear, financial transfer from public debt to private wealth. More exactly, it is the transfer from the net public debt to the differential between savings and investment, or S -I. The present paper takes that Franco Modigliani's thesis in a broader sense, places it in the context of the Smithsonian thesis, and follows the impact of fiscal decisions upon he accumulatio and allocation of property rights. The reason of referring to property rights is twofold.
Firstly, staying into Franco Modigliani's spirit, it is just as much about balances as about flows. Both savings, and investment are flows that alter the balance of assets. Secondly, turning to the Smithsonian approach, we assume that public debt accumulates mostly because private providers of capital want to lend. Yet, "wanting" is imprecise from the point of view of a social scientist. Assessing what people want is essentially psychological in its method, i.e. it is almost impossible to aggregate the "wanting" at the scale of a social system. Yet, social sciences have a set of concepts appropriate for that purpose, namely the theory of games, and its pivotal concept of strategy. Strategies, in turn, are not oriented on assets as such, but on the rights to those assets. It is not indifferent whether I rent a house, or own it. In both cases, I possess the asset, but only in the latter case, I have full benefits out of that possession. This is the reason for referring to property rights.
In the next chapter, a theoretical model is introduced. Its purpose is to create a logical path starting at the questions and doubts mentioned above, leading through econometric research and further to developing conclusions about public governance.
The model is followed, in another chapter, by the presentation of empirical research connected to the topic.
The theoretical model
"Economists should cease proffering policy advice as if they were employed by a benevolent despot, and they should look to the structure within which political decisions are made." James Buchanan (1987 34 ) In the present model, the logic adopted is that of advancing gradually from weak assumptions to stronger ones. The weak assumptions are those, which give the basic logical frame to empirical research and allow the selection of data and methodological tools for such research. As we add stronger and stronger assumptions to the model, it is possible to make the connection between the results of empirical research conducted by the author, and that of other researchers. In other words, strengthening the assumptions of the model serves to anchor the findings of empirical research in the acquis of social sciences.
We can safely, and weakly assume that the way society works may be represented as a social game with imperfect information, in the sense presented by John Harsanyi Now, we start adding stronger assumptions. The capacity to bring, through fiscal decisions, significant changes in the set of property rights means economic power.
Any hierarchical, social structure - states and corporations included -- is able to sustain itself over long periods of time if it has both legitimation, and economic power.
Legitimation is defined qualitatively, and quantitatively. On the one hand, it is a set of basic rights, and a set of actions to which the government is entitled. On the other hand, The public sector of any given country is an organization, or, if we take local governments into account, a semi--hierarchical network of organizations. In that sense, the state is not a monolith, but a structured political community. What we can call the behaviour of the state is the outcome of a multitude of individual strategies, through which every singe subject belonging to the public sector maximizes their discretionary, political power on the grounds of a given combination of legitimation, and economic power. A game--theoretic approach can be used to model the transformation of individual strategies into collective political action. The present paper mostly taps from the John Harsanyi's theory of games with imperfect information 
In that Marxist, social mechanism of capital transfer, the powers of public agents have the social role of quasi--property rights. The constructive possession of capital by public agents relies on the general principle of the sovereignty of the state. It is probably the strongest possible case of constructive possession. Besides the powers expressly written in the law, there is a whole set of discretional powers. The latter emerge whenever the law allows decisional freedom to public agents, either on purpose, or by unwanted collision of legal rules. Those discretional powers are directly proportional to the amount of capital that public agents have possession of within their discretional freedom. Thus, it is to assume that the distribution of discretional public powers across the social system significantly influences the set of property rights. At any given moment t, the current set of property rights is the outcome of a social game, played by k players 57 , who participate in public borrowing and in its redistribution. At the moment t, each player j plays an individual strategy St(j), defined by both the expected, and the actual property rights. Equation (2) formalizes these strategies. At the moment t--1 each player formulates expectations as for: a) the future, individual, political (pl*t--1) and financial (f*t--1) profits coming from the expected property rights b) the acquisition price of future assets (c*t--1), and c) the future, expected transaction costs tr*t--1 connected to these assets. Those expectations lead to actions, which, in turn, lead to the formation of an actual set of property rights owned by the player j at the moment t, characterized by analogous variables, namely: political profits plt, financial profits ft, acquisition price ct, and transaction costs trt. The relationship of these actual profits and costs to the expected ones defines the consistency of the player's strategy. Players seek consistent strategies, i.e. they maximize consistency in the first place, expected gains coming as secondary. In the next step, i.e. in the passage from the moment t to the moment t+1, players formulate their strategies on the grounds of past consistency, i.e.
on the grounds of the
As experience accumulates, at the moment t+1 each player acquires a modified set of property rights, and again, the strategic consistency is evaluated on the grounds of the
This leads to formulating further expectations etc.
Each individual strategy St(j) is defined by a function of consistency CSt(j), as shown in the equation (2a). 57 The concept of player herein is quite broad. For example, a politician may be a minister, and a private owner in parallel. As a minister, he takes actions that influence private property rights, and as a private owner, he develops a strategy too. Besides, players do not have to be individuals; they can be organisations. Hence, there can be players inside players, so to say.
Fiscal policy is grounded in the aggregate consistency of strategies played by all the public agents taken together display, possible to represent mathematically as the integral of individual consistencies, or
. The combination of taxes T and public borrowing PD is the outcome of their respective, aggregate consistencies from the public agents' standpoint, namely of
, and
. This is formalized in the equation (2b).
The respective consistencies of taxation, and public borrowing tend to display significant disparity. The outcome of taxation is highly uncertain. As legal rules of taxation are voted, public agents formulate expectations as for the future tax base and its average rate of taxation. It sums up, by and large, to predicting the taxpayers' future economic and legal patterns of behaviour, which, in turn, are the outcome of fiscal policy. A vicious circle appears, and the more radical are the current changes in tax regulations, the more vicious it becomes. Conversely, public borrowing is a highly predictable set of contracts, whose conditions are greatly standardized by the practices of the capital market. As public agents maximize consistency in the first place, their strategies will be naturally oriented on maximizing public borrowing within the available limits, and on considering taxation only as the necessary tool to finance the resulting, residual value of public expenses, impossible to cover with debt.
Property rights encompass three types of assets: productive (ex. machinery), real unproductive (ex. land), and financial (ex. securities). For productive assets are highly specific and not really liquid, they display the highest transaction costs. By contrast, the highly liquid and unspecific financial assets generate the lowest transaction costs, real unproductive assets coming in the middle between the two. Individual strategies focused on the acquisition of property rights to productive assets give an aggregate outcome measured by the aggregate investment "I". Conversely, individual acquisitions of the real unproductive and financial assets sum up to the aggregate surplus of savings over investment, or "S -I". Equation (3) formalizes this assumption, with z corresponding to a hypothetical past moment when the accumulation of the present set of property rights started.
The strategies of public agents influence the formation of property rights in three manners. As public agents, at the bottom line, are also private ones (all public functionaries are citizens, too) they use the financial profits derived from the redistribution of public funds to acquire property rights. Secondly, the enforcement of discretional powers held by the public agents frequently leads to important investment decisions in the private sector. Public procurement is maybe the best example. Thirdly, public debt consists mostly of securities, which are the object of property rights too.
They are financial assets with low transaction cost, relatively low yield, but a very low risk. The more sovereign bonds is there in circulation, the lower is the reference level, in individual strategies of property rights, as for consistency, and expected financial profits. A substantial presence of public debt in the capital market tends to bias individual strategies of property rights towards high aversion to risk, high liquidity, low transaction costs, and low expected profits. Such strategic preferences mean more money spent on financial assets, and on the real unproductive ones, at the detriment of productive assets. In other words, it means more S -I, and less I. In the same time, significant public borrowing gives to public agents more discretional power, and increases their appetite for risk, as there is more to gain in terms of said power. Thus, substantial public debt favours relatively conservative strategies from the part of private agents as for their property rights, and relatively risky strategies from the part of public agents, as for the enlargement of their discretional power.
The consistency of public agents' strategies, as for discretional power grounded in public borrowing, modifies the strategies of private agents as for property rights.
Equation (4) gives a synthetic expression of a social system, in which fiscal decisions shape private allocation regarding the type of assets acquired, which, in turn, brings an aggregate result at the level of investment I, and the private surplus S -I. The resulting set of property rights further shapes fiscal decision etc.
Equations (1) - (4) Regarding restrictive fiscal policy, one assumption is to make right from the start: they are not initiated because of moral judgments in the lines of: "it is better to be mean than profuse". International political pressure is the key motive force. That pressure is, in a sense, an anticipated prevention of the possible default, i.e. of discrimination among liabilities. Some creditors take care of forcing the government to reduce the stream of benefits to all the stakeholders more or less equally. Once again, we have one group of creditors that enters into a conflict of interests with all the other stakeholders. Yet, this
time, that precise group outnumbers the others.
The type of individual strategies as for property rights marks the frontier between the conflicted groups of interest. Some private agents prioritize the consistence of investment in sovereign bonds. When they perceive that consistency as threatened by the government's excessive indebtedness, they start preventive action. Should they succeed, restrictive fiscal policy is implemented. If they fail, public borrowing continues unaltered, with the eventual default in view.
Whilst governments tend to be considered as the most reliable debtors, they also have The principle of sovereignty has also its procedural equivalent, known as the act of state.
The act of state principle assumes that the courts of any given country have no jurisdiction over the acts of other countries' governments. As a procedural rule, and at the difference of sovereign immunity, the act of state principle cannot be waived, but, in 59 The real influence of creditors upon the political course of the indebted government, the principle of sovereign immunity taken into account, determines the limit of public indebtedness. In other words, the accumulation of public debt lasts until an influential enough group of creditors forces the government to implement restrictive fiscal policy.
Debt defaults, contrarily to the common opinion, do not necessarily put a brake to indebtedness. In that context, some change seems to emerge still it does not regard sovereign debt as such yet. It is about the investor--state dispute settlement clause included in over 2500 bilateral investment treaties signed by more than 174 countries.
That clause, allowing international arbitration in legal disputes between foreign private investors and their host governments, has been giving rise to a quickly increasing number of cases, and verdicts (for more details, see for example: Franck 2007 65 ). Whilst not concerning directly the issue of sovereign debt, those cases seem to be symptomatic for a new pattern of legal approach to sovereign immunity. Now, we add even stronger assumptions about the political system. We imagine two, alternative political games. The first alternative is that the aggregate impact of fiscal decisions upon private property rights is proportional to the political power of the strongest political players. In other words, the more concentrated is political power, the greater the impact of fiscal decisions upon private property rights. This is the world of mighty dictators. The second, alternative game makes the impact of fiscal decisions upon private property rights proportional to the number of political players with any political power, or veto players according to Tsebelis (Tsebelis 2002 ). This game finds the best description in the French saying "the more of us join in, the more fun we all have".
The above distinction leads to formulating the last hypothesis, namely that the impact of fiscal decision upon private property rights is significantly related to the relative dispersion of political power within the political system.
The next chapter presents empirical research, conducted by the author in order to verify the hypotheses stated in the theoretical model. 
Empirical research
The purpose of the empirical study, as introduced in this chapter, was to grasp quantitatively the capital in possession of the public sector, and the possible patterns of relation between said capital, and public debt. The available statistics (mostly those published by the International Monetary Fund) provide two main variables: the total of public expenditures, and the amount of debt--like financial assets held by the government. The latter variable can be computed as the difference between gross public debt, and net public debt.
Three official databases have been used, to construe a data panel of 1346 observations in total, for 77 countries (see Table 1 The variables taken into account in the present research are: a) mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) b) primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) c) proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) d) mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births) e) improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) f) incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) g) vulnerable employment, total (% of total employment) h) net migration i) life expectancy at birth, female (years) j) life expectancy at birth, male (years) 67 The variables included into the present, compound database from the Database of Political Institutions were mostly the systemic ones, or those, which had been judged, more or less intuitively, as systemic, namely: system, and pluralty. As for the detailed definitions, see: Keefer, P, 2012, DPI2012, Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions, Development Research Group The World Bank, Issued: December 2012 68 Observation ends in 2010, fault of further statistics available. 69 Observation ends in 1999, faul of reliable statistics about net debt in subsequent years. By "reliable" the author means such statistics, in which the net debt differs in value from the gross debt; all governments hold as least some financial assets periodization of the sample, i.e. the number of countries observed each consecutive year, progressively grows until 2006 (see Table 2 in the Appendix). Earlier years are less represented than the later ones; hence have less informational content, which will be subsequently explored as for the key variables.
On the grounds of data available in the IMF database, two additional variables have been computed. Firstly, following the intuition of Franco Modigliani, the difference S -I, between gross national savings and private investment, as construed as another measure of capital formation. Using the S - I differential is criticisable. If we adopt the strictly Keynesian point of view, S -I does not exist, in fact. Then, even if one ignores the Keynesian identity S = I, it is easily demonstrable that the basic accounting identities that serve to compute the GDP, and the GNI, allow assuming that S -I = net exports. Yet, the preliminary tests showed that those allegedly obvious accounting identities do not necessarily hold as functional correlations in the sample studied. Secondly, the difference between gross public debt, and net public debt has been considered as measuring the scale of a separate fiscal phenomenon, namely the accumulation of financial assets in the public sector.
The first analytical step consisted in assessing both the long--term trends as for fiscality, and capital formation, as well as the possible bias in the assessment of those trends, due to uneven representation of particular years in the whole data panel. To that purpose, for each of those main variables median and mean value in the sample, as well as its cross--sectional variance had been computed for each year separately. The time series of the cross--sectional mean is supposed to be informative about the relative importance of the given aggregate in time. The median may indicate the prevalence of a given pattern, whilst its comparison to the mean informs about the relative heteroscedacity of the cross--sectional distribution, thus about the relative disparities in fiscal models. Variance goes in the same direction, informing how broad is the spread of tail cases in crosssectional distributions.
The time series of each of these statistics had been linearly, OLS regressed on the number of annual observations. If the corresponding regression rendered an R 2 coefficient of determination above 0,1, the corrresponding regression function was subsequently used to smooth linearly the raw time series of the given statistic. In the deducible from the gross debt, e.g. cash balances at the end of the year. In general, the sample does not contain some countries that are most interesting regarding their indebtedness, e.g. Argentina or India. Yet, for the same reason, namely lack of data about the net debt or net debt equal to the gross one, those countries have not been included in the empirical research.
opposite case (i.e. R 2 < 0,1), no linear smoothing was done. In order to express all trends in a comparable manner, each time series, both raw and linearly smoothed, was transformed in a constant -base index, with the year 2000 as the base (i.e. equal to 1,00). Graphs 1 -14, in the Appendix, show the results of that exploration for particular variables. That analytica step allows noticing a generally decreasing mean and variance of all the fiscal statistics, with the exception of the gross public debt. The latter displays a cyclically varying mean, and growing variance. It looks as if all the countries in the sample studied converged to more or less the same model of fiscality, with a steadily decreasing economic power of governments. Conversely, the pattern of gross public indebtedness seems to become more and more idiosyncratic, just as the pattern of aggregate savings. Thus, we have a sample, in which the accumulation of public debt becomes more and more idiosyncratic, just as the formation of private capital. Current fiscality of the countries studied, on the other hand, steadily converges to a narrowing band of possible states, and the central tendency of that band is rather decreasing.
The next step of analysis consisted in testing for the connection between fiscal variables, and those reflecting private capital formation. In those, and consecutive tests, the same method had been used, namely linear, OLS regression, with robust standard errors accounting for the possible heteroscedacity. The compound database used in panel data analysis contains country--level datasets displaying quite a disparate volume 70 . That disparity of observation spans is the reason for not accounting for fixed effects at the country level in the subsequent econometric test. As the database combines data from various years, very probably non--stationary, it had been transformed for the purposes of statistical analysis. The values of particular variables in the initial database have been standardized, by subtracting the mean of the given column and dividing it by its standard deviation to produce a column with the mean 0 and standard deviation equal to 1. As public debt is in the very centre of the research, the important question was whether to focus on the gross debt, or on the net one. In the database used, these two debt. Yet, in this case, the general question is slightly different, namely: why the capital transfers covered by the general, legal category of public borrowing are the way they are? Intuitively, the gross debt, reflecting the total amount of capital absorbed by the public sector via that category of contracts, seems more important. Still, each test had been conducted in two versions, alternating the gross, and the net debt as explanatory variable. The general rule was that if the results for the two versions were similar, the test with gross debt was chosen as the base for further theorizing. Should the results differ significantly, especially as for the sign of the coefficient of regression, both tests were included in further inference. Table 3 in the Appendix shows the results of regression tests between the fiscal variables as explanatory ones, and, respectively, aggregate savings, aggregate investment, and the aggregate S -I differential. Fiscal variables mean almost nothing for aggregate investment; their impact is mostly observable at the level of aggregate savings. The current account balance seems to have a decisive role in private capital formation in the sample. Surprisingly enough, public expenditure, and gross public debt tend to impact negatively the gross savings, whilst public revenues, i.e. taxation, have a strong, positive influence. Those results seem counterintuitive, yet here they are. The more taxes levied, the more private savings accumulated. As for the S -I differential, the initial intuition was correct: the current account balance (which is a good approximation of net exports), explains just a fraction of it. The accumulation of public debt seems to build up that S -I surplus; yet, once more taxation has that surprising, positive effect.
In order to contrast the impact of fiscal decisions upon private property rights with that upon social outcomes, another series of tests was conducted. Table  4 , in the Appendix, shows the results of regressing linearly selected social variables on fiscal variables.
Gross public debt has an undoubtfully noxious influence: the more indebted the public sector, the poorer social outcomes. Thus, the whole thesis of public borrowing serving the public mission of governments seems to be false, at least in the sample studied. 
Conclusion
Different political systems generate different interaction between fiscality, capital formation, and social outcomes. Thus, different political systems generate different link between strategies oriented on political power, those oriented on social outcomes, and those oriented on private property rights.
Public borrowing is essentially a transfer of capital. That capital keeps on being transferred to the richest countries in the world. The transfer is largely driven by the internal, political mechanics of these countries. Thus, the accumulation of public debt in those richest countries is an almost self--sustainable mechanism, limited mostly by the tolerance of capital markets. That tolerance is probably based on a complex set of criteria. There is the potentially non--optimal allocation of publicly borrowed money in non--productive assets in the private sector. There is the political power provided by borrowed capital. Thus, we have a flow of capital, in which strong political drivers push to non--optimal allocation of capital at the global scale. If we assume the dominance of political factors in this mechanism, logically only a substantial change in these could bring a substantial change in the long--run geography of public borrowing. A substantial political change would probably mean less veto players, more policy change, and more government stability. In other words, it would mean a possible limitation of democracy.
The income side of the fiscal equation encompasses flows, which are essentially the circulating capital of the whole economy. Taxes do diminish the individual, disposable income, but they create a flow that serves to earn more income. Public expenditures, on the other hand, seem to push private capital out of circulation. Probably there is substitution between savings and public goods created by public expenditures, and a complementarity between consumption and those public goods. In terms of Franco Modigliani's lifecycle hypothesis of savings, taxation seems to create more incentives for saving, whilst public goods bring fewer incentives.
The value added of the empirical research presented in the present paper is to carry out further the distinction between various political systems as for their fiscality. In presidential ones, or the ones with plurality, the fiscality works exactly opposite to those with parliamentary systems, and with proportionality in elections. Parliamentary systems use public debt to increase private S -I, and private savings, whilst the influence of fiscality upon social outcomes is problematic. In presidential systems, it is the opposite. Fiscal impact upon capital formation is at the limit of any certainty, whilst the fiscal impact upon social outcomes is strong and generally positive. In democracies with plurality in elections, the fiscal impact upon capital formation is at the limit of significance, whilst in proportional democracies there is that strong influence of public revenues upon S -I, savings, and opposite on private investment. Source: author's Source: author's
